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BACK TO BIAFRA?: DEFENDING BORDERS




The international community is not ready to accept separa-
tion of states. Territorial integrity of states is a guiding princi-
ple .... There will be no change - on the contrary, there is a
stronger will on the part of the international community not
to tolerate separatism.'
-Edouard Brunner
U.N. Mediator in Abkhazia
INTRODUCTION
In the confusion of the post-Cold War world, few norms of
international law enjoy more widespread acceptance than the
principle that existing state borders must not be changed by
force from without or within. As a proposition about relations
between states, this norm contributes to peace and stability and
is generally unexceptionable. But as a proposition about what a
state may therefore legitimately do to populations within its bor-
ders, in order to preserve such borders, this norm is far more
problematic. Indeed, an absolutist insistence on it would in fact
simultaneously deny a priori to aggrieved groups in some states
the ultimate means, either used or threatened, to defend their
rights against the power of the state and allow states to cloak
themselves with international respectability while engaging in
the massive violation of human rights of their populations.
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Until recently, the international community focused primar-
ily on external challenges to existing borders without giving
much thought to these internal challenges and to the human
rights consequences of its position on the stability of borders. As
recent events have shown, however, such challenges are likely to
become an ever more prominent feature of the international
landscape. Consequently, this second facet of the principle of
the inviolability of borders deserves closer scrutiny. In this Essay,
I would like to raise some of the issues arising from three of its
aspects: the consequences of an absolutist position on border
stability for states, their populations, and the international com-
munity; the consequences of the rejection of this position in the
name of defense of human rights; and the ways in which the
international community can act to maximize both the stability
of borders and the defense of human rights.
Before turning to a discussion of these issues, a preliminary
observation is in order. As the reader will have noticed, I juxta-
pose the question of border stability and of human rights rather
than, as is more often done, between border stability and the
right of nations to self-determination. I do so because the for-
mer is broader than the latter, because the former explicitly rec-
ognizes that groups may form and seek exit from states for other
than ethno-national reasons, and because it allows for a discus-
sion of the consequences of state-sponsored attacks on individu-
als and their response instead of limiting the issue to state at-
tacks on groups.' While it is true that insistence of national self-
determination will likely constitute the large number of cases in
this category, it is important to distinguish in our discussions of
border stability the related but different issues of human rights
and national self-determination, especially since the latter has
become the subject of so many polemical stacks that, intention-
ally or not, obscure the human rights issues involved.
I. DEFENDING BORDERS
The attractions of an absolutist position on the defense of
borders even from within are both many and obvious. They are
rooted in the modern definition of the state as that institution
2. See generally Paul A. Goble, Federalism and Human Rights in the Soviet Union, 23
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 399 (1990) (discussing competitive quality of defense of individual
rights and defense of group rights within normal Western conception).
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enjoying a monopoly on the legitimate use of force on a given
territory. Moreover, such a position provides for international
stability in most cases at least in the short run, except to the ex-
tent that such a position may generate potentially destabilizing
refugee flows. And perhaps most significantly for purposes of
this discussion, this proposition provides an important precondi-
tion for the stability of the state and hence for the only institu-
tion that can provide a routinized defense of the individual
against a Hobbesian state of nature and hence a protection in
most cases for the individual and group rights.
But if the arguments for an absolutist position on defending
borders are clear, the difficulties are even greater if less obvious
at least for those concerned with the defense of human rights.
By adopting a position defending stability above everything else,
we intentionally or not fall into the position of defending the
status quo regardless of how unjust. We thus permit the state to
violate the human rights of individuals and groups by using
force while effectively denying these victims the right to respond
with force.'
Even more problematic is the implicit assumption that cur-
rent borders must be legitimized, especially if they enclose coun-
tries deemed to be democratic. That rests on an even more
problematic assumption about how such borders came into be-
ing. One of the key problems with democratic theory is that it
defines how a community should operate but does not define
how that community should be defined or how it should come
into existence. An absolutist position on borders would have
precluded the independence of the United States, for example,
a fact that is seldom acknowledged by the absolutist position.
Moreover, the absolutist position, by taking the interna-
tional community off the hook and allowing it to dismiss actions
of states inside their borders as being simply the latter's "internal
affairs," is profoundly corrosive of human rights principles. Not
only does it allow a Biafra or a Chechnya, but it inevitably gener-
3. Even if this is defensible in most cases, there are real limits to it. For example, it
is often said that secession from a state can be accomplished with only the agreement of
that state. Not only is this a serious misreading of what actually happened in the former
Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, but it effectively precludes secession in all but
the most unusual circumstances. More to the point, by encouraging states to believe
that their borders are sacred, this notion may lead them to behave in ways that will
make the issue of secession more lively.
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ates refugee flows, reduces the moral suasion of the interna-
tional community, and thus undermines both the stability its
proponents seek as well as the legitimacy of the states that adopt
it.
II. DIENDING HUMAN RIGHTS
But if we concede that an absolutist position on the defense
of borders is problematic, does that mean that an absolutist posi-
tion in the defense of human rights, regardless of its conse-
quences for borders, is a good substitute? While such a position
may be morally attractive at one level, it can as easily become
subversive of its own realization as can its opposite. First, such a
position would introduce chaos into the international system by
destroying the entities capable of protecting human rights. Sec-
ond, it would only serve to intensify the competition between
individual and group rights by tipping the existing balance to-
ward the latter because only the latter could seek resolution
under such a system. And third, by encouraging increasingly ho-
mogenous and in some cases more authoritarian states, it could
also undermine human rights.
Moreover, the international community, based as it is on
the existence of states, would subvert itself by adopting such a
position. Its efforts to get involved to date have shown precisely
the following limitations: (1) the relative selectivity in the de-
fense of human rights depending on the power of the state in-
volved; (2) the lack of any agreement on what such a defense
would look like or how such a mechanism might be created; and
(3) the fact that intervention by the international community
may in many cases make things worse, at least for some people.
This last point is especially critical. The intervention on behalf
of ethnic Russians in the post-Soviet states by the Commission
for Security and Cooperation in Europe ("CSCE") has often
been counterproductive. On the one hand, it has led local Rus-
sians in these states to assume that they can use their ethnicity to
make demands on these states. On the other hand, it has con-
vinced at least some of the states that the ethnicization of politics
by the Russians justifies a responsive ethnicization by these
states.
To say all this is not to say that secession in the name of self-
determination of defense of human rights is the only answer. A
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variety of other means are available: consociational arrange-
ments, federal power-sharing, and the establishment of alterna-
tive and more comprehensive identities upon which democratic
citizenship can rest. But in an age when the state is becoming an
even larger player in society, the question of who controls it be-
comes ever more important. And unless that state is to become
less important, an unlikely development in most regions, seces-
sion must remain an option.
III. DEFENDING BOTH: CAN THESE TWO VALUES BE
COMBINED?
Recent experience suggests that the two values can be com-
bined, as long as a number of exceptions are allowed. Most of
the current justification for the stability of borders and for inter-
national concern about human rights flows from the same docu-
ment, the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 ("Final Act"). It is perhaps
useful to recall this dual fact: the Helsinki principles call for the
observation of human rights and for the stability of borders, the
latter to be changed only by agreement and not by force.
These two principles reflected a compromise at the time.
The Soviet Union sought a declaration that existing borders in
Europe could not be changed as a means to legitimate Stalin's
redrawing of the map of Eastern Europe after World War II.
The United States, and to a lesser extent the West European Na-
tions, insisted on three qualifications of this principle. First, the
West insisted on a clear statement about human rights. Second,
the West demanded that the Final Act include a modification of
inviolability so that the possibility that Germany could be reuni-
fied peacefully at some point would remain open. And third,
the United States made it clear in the negotiating record that
nothing in the Final Act should be construed as U.S. recognition
of the forced incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet
Union. Thus, even in that document, this conflict was reflected
rather than resolved.
Ultimately, the balance between the two principles must re-
flect a judgment about the nature of a particular state, its behav-
ior toward its own population, and the availability of remedies
other than succession. It must also reflect the revolution in com-
munications that gives smaller groups a chance to appear on the
world stage and the changes in the world that make intervention
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more difficult if not impossible. No one can come up with a
cookbook answer.
CONCLUSION
We can go only so far as to say that we are disposed to sup-
port the inviolability of borders from internal attack but are un-
willing to absolutize it. By so doing, we will remain open to
claims by aggrieved groups in some states. However unsatisfac-
tory such a conclusion is, it is less morally and legally offensive
than its alternatives. To do otherwise leads us back to Biafra, as
Chechnya shows, to grant states a right to ride roughshod over
human rights and thus to purchase an illusory stability at the cost
of both human rights and our own moral position.
